Case Green: intention, preparation and a chosen moment
Explain what a dated military directive proves about intent and what it cannot establish about an earlier crisis.
Exam scope and assessment notes
One hundred and three introductory lessons, 309 explained tasks, 103 analytical models and seventeen selected comparison workshops address revised International AS enquiry 9.3. This is partial coverage, not full AS or A Level preparation. All 24 editorial working entries have introductory links; these are not an official denominator or a completion percentage. The sequence introduces British and French foundations, selected ideological arguments, rearmament and the Rhineland, Anschluss, the Sudetenland negotiations, Munich and the March 1939 occupation. Selected public-consent evidence, British opposition, German resource mechanisms and production forecasts, strategic expectations and Italian intervention conditions are introduced. This does not complete German or Italian resource balances, psychological or causal evaluation, or the wider effects of appeasement. Public opinion and opposition need wider sources, chronology, French perspectives and policy effects. Wider British, French and German comparisons, affected perspectives, economic costs, counterfactual alternatives and enquiry 9.4 remain unfinished. The eight-demand memorandum has been checked in the English documentary edition, not the full original speech or every translation. Prague, Runciman, negotiations and Munich still need fuller implementation and outcomes. Historical depth, wider authentic reading, subject-specialist review, full source sets, timed papers and calibrated marking remain unfinished. Existing 2026 lessons receive no automatic revised-year coverage credit. International history, 1929–1939 belongs to International Paper 1 in 2029 and International Paper 2 in 2027 and 2028. Keep it separate from the 1919–1929 topic, imperialism rotation and 2026 material. Paper 1 Historical sources is 75 minutes and 40 marks: both parts of one question use four sources totalling at most 600 words, at least three written and up to one visual. Part (a) compares two sources for 15 marks; part (b) uses all four and contextual knowledge for a 25-mark judgement. Paper 2 Outline study is 105 minutes and 60 marks: answer two questions from one section, both parts of each, with a 10-mark causal explanation and a 20-mark argument. These lessons are not complete papers or calibrated assessment.
Before you begin
- Distinguish a planning assumption, a stated preference, a proposal and an implemented decision
- Identify the responsible actor and date; separate contemporary arguments, later accounts and verified outcomes
Work on paper. Try each question before revealing help, and explain why your method works.
Quick readiness check
How should you explain changes in international relations?
What you will learn
- Did the readiness date itself order a completed invasion on 1 October?
- What can the factory passage establish about the resource motive?
- How should the directive be combined with Wilson’s 21 May uncertainty?
Develop an International AS historical argument
- Write your own response before opening the model.
- Use dated evidence, identify actors and compare aims, obligations and practical outcomes. Attribute claims and distinguish contemporary texts from later editorial context.
One hundred and three introductory lessons, 309 explained tasks, 103 analytical models and seventeen selected comparison workshops address revised International AS enquiry 9.3. This is partial coverage, not full AS or A Level preparation. All 24 editorial working entries have introductory links; these are not an official denominator or a completion percentage. The sequence introduces British and French foundations, selected ideological arguments, rearmament and the Rhineland, Anschluss, the Sudetenland negotiations, Munich and the March 1939 occupation. Selected public-consent evidence, British opposition, German resource mechanisms and production forecasts, strategic expectations and Italian intervention conditions are introduced. This does not complete German or Italian resource balances, psychological or causal evaluation, or the wider effects of appeasement. Public opinion and opposition need wider sources, chronology, French perspectives and policy effects. Wider British, French and German comparisons, affected perspectives, economic costs, counterfactual alternatives and enquiry 9.4 remain unfinished. The eight-demand memorandum has been checked in the English documentary edition, not the full original speech or every translation. Prague, Runciman, negotiations and Munich still need fuller implementation and outcomes. Historical depth, wider authentic reading, subject-specialist review, full source sets, timed papers and calibrated marking remain unfinished. Existing 2026 lessons receive no automatic revised-year coverage credit.
Original teaching brief and analytical model
The opening brief is original StudyForA teaching prose, not a quotation or contemporary source. International history, 1929–1939 belongs to International Paper 1 in 2029 and International Paper 2 in 2027 and 2028. Keep it separate from the 1919–1929 topic, imperialism rotation and 2026 material. Paper 1 Historical sources is 75 minutes and 40 marks: both parts of one question use four sources totalling at most 600 words, at least three written and up to one visual. Part (a) compares two sources for 15 marks; part (b) uses all four and contextual knowledge for a 25-mark judgement. Paper 2 Outline study is 105 minutes and 60 marks: answer two questions from one section, both parts of each, with a 10-mark causal explanation and a 20-mark argument. These lessons are not complete papers or calibrated assessment.
StudyForA teaching brief · original prose · Case Green: intention, preparation and a chosen moment
[1] Original analytical teaching prose, not a quotation or contemporary source. Explain what a dated military directive proves about intent and what it cannot establish about an earlier crisis.
1. How should the directive be combined with Wilson’s 21 May uncertainty?
Compare after trying
The Case Green passages provide strong evidence of aggressive intent and preparation because they reproduce an internal directive dated 30 May rather than only a later accusation. The instruction to await or create a suitable moment connects political conditions with military action. Surprise and a rapid initial result were intended to discourage outside intervention, showing why preparation and diplomacy could be linked.
The readiness requirement from 1 October at the latest was nevertheless not identical to an order proving that an invasion occurred then. Further directions and determination of the date were reserved. Likewise the aim of preserving and restarting factories establishes an expected resource benefit, not a later audited gain or a completed comparative rearmament advantage.
Chronology is essential when combining this document with the May alarm. Wilson’s 21 May uncertainty concerned what the missions could confirm about movements at that time. A 30 May directive cannot alone prove a concentration or cancelled attack nine days earlier, while earlier uncertainty cannot refute later intent. A supported explanation assigns each source its proper evidential task and tests capability and execution separately.
Why this response fits
- Build a reasoned answer with specific evidence and an explicit connection to international relations.
- Consider the source’s author, date, audience, purpose and limits; distinguish contemporary statements from later editorial context.
- This original self-check model is not an authentic examination script, calibrated mark or Cambridge grade.
Identify the contemporary record inside a later proceeding
The Nuremberg proceedings of 3 December 1945 quote the Case Green directive of 30 May 1938 and its covering letter as parts of document 388-PS. The directive states an intention to destroy Czechoslovakia through military action and to await or create a suitable political and military moment. These are selected passages from a contemporary planning record reproduced in court, not merely the prosecutor’s later summary. Their force lies in the internal expression of intent, although a full original-file and translation collation is outside this lesson.
Separate readiness from the final attack order
The covering letter required execution to be assured from 1 October at the latest. The directive nevertheless reserved further directions and determination of the date. A readiness requirement and a decision to commence an operation were therefore different stages. The document also sought surprise, political justification and a rapid initial result to discourage outside intervention. These aims explain how military preparation and diplomacy could operate together; they do not show that every specified capability was actually achieved or that an invasion occurred on the readiness date.
Read resources as an objective rather than a completed gain
A selected war-economic passage called for rapid reconnaissance and restarting of important factories and for sparing installations where operations permitted. This reveals the expected value of Czechoslovak resources to German war capacity. It is evidence of an intended benefit, not a measured balance sheet showing what was later acquired, how quickly it became usable or whether Germany gained more relative preparation time than its opponents. Such outcome questions require later evidence and comparison, not a total invented from the planning language.
Keep the May chronology visible
A directive dated 30 May cannot alone confirm a rumoured troop concentration on 21 May or prove that a particular attack that weekend was cancelled by deterrence. Earlier planning and later escalation must be dated and examined separately. Conversely, the lack of confirmation in a diplomatic report on 21 May does not refute a later internal intention to attack. A strong explanation combines the records without forcing them to answer the same question: contemporary uncertainty about movements, internal aggressive intent and actual execution are related but different claims.
Sources for this lesson
- Cambridge History 9489 · 2027–2029 · enquiry 9.3 pp. 35–36 · official Version 2 PDF retrieved; selected enquiry and rotation pages checked with the April 2025 update
- Cambridge History 9489 · 2027–2029 update · Version 2 changes, April 2025
- Nuremberg proceedings, 3 December 1945 · selected Case Green directive and covering letter of 30 May 1938, document 388-PS, item 11 · political prerequisites, preparation timing and factory-installation passages
- Hugh R. Wilson, Ambassador in Germany, 21 May 1938, 6 p.m. · FRUS 1938, volume I, document 508
- Cambridge History 9489, 2027–2029, Version 2 · enquiry 9.3, printed pages 35–36
Pause and explain
Which explanation best fits this lesson?
Worked example
Did the readiness date itself order a completed invasion on 1 October?
Show the worked solution
- Identify assured readiness from 1 October at the latest.
- Identify the reserved further directions and date.
- Distinguish planning, achieved capability and execution.
Answer No. The letter set a readiness requirement while the directive reserved further directions and the date of action. It does not prove that every capability was ready or that an invasion actually began on 1 October simply because that date appears in the planning record.
Try a topic test
Choose Easy, Normal or Difficult. Save your answers and open worked review after finishing.
Test this topic →From guided practice to a new situation
Write your answer and reasoning first. Use a hint only if you are stuck. The model solution is for self-checking; your written work is not automatically marked.
Guided: Did the readiness date itself order a completed invasion on 1 October?
Give me a hint
Read the covering requirement alongside the reserved decision about timing.
Compare my reasoning
- Identify assured readiness from 1 October at the latest.
- Identify the reserved further directions and date.
- Distinguish planning, achieved capability and execution.
No. The letter set a readiness requirement while the directive reserved further directions and the date of action. It does not prove that every capability was ready or that an invasion actually began on 1 October simply because that date appears in the planning record.
Look for these in your work
- Uses the identified date, actor, document and reporting chain accurately
- Explains a causal or comparative connection while separating proposal, perception, evidence, preparation and implementation
Independent: What can the factory passage establish about the resource motive?
Give me a hint
Separate an intended war-economic benefit from a later measured outcome.
Compare my reasoning
- Identify plans to preserve and restart valuable installations.
- Explain the expected contribution to war capacity.
- Identify the later evidence needed for actual gains and comparative effects.
It establishes that planners valued the factories as potential contributors to German war capacity. It does not measure the resources actually acquired, their eventual usability or the net comparative rearmament advantage. Those results require later production, implementation and comparative evidence.
Look for these in your work
- Uses the identified date, actor, document and reporting chain accurately
- Explains a causal or comparative connection while separating proposal, perception, evidence, preparation and implementation
Transfer: How should the directive be combined with Wilson’s 21 May uncertainty?
Give me a hint
Match each dated source to the proposition it can establish.
Compare my reasoning
- Use Wilson for the missions’ lack of confirmed movement information on 21 May.
- Use the 30 May directive for internal intentions and preparation requirements.
- Avoid making later planning prove an earlier concentration or earlier uncertainty refute later intent.
The records answer different questions. Wilson reports uncertainty at the missions on 21 May; the later directive supplies evidence of internal intent and required preparation. Together they show why perceived danger and planning need careful chronology. Neither alone proves an earlier attack force existed or was deterred, and the earlier uncertainty does not cancel the later aggressive intention.
Look for these in your work
- Uses the identified date, actor, document and reporting chain accurately
- Explains a causal or comparative connection while separating proposal, perception, evidence, preparation and implementation
Common mistakes
- The selected directive passages and covering letter are not a claim that every original file or translation has been collated.
- A planning objective for factories is not an audited resource gain or automatic completion of the wider comparative rearmament strand.
What can you explain now?
Which explanation best fits this lesson?
Compare with the explanation
Distinguish internal intent, readiness requirements, a reserved date and evidence of actual capability or execution
The directive is strong evidence of intent and planning; timing, capability and implementation require separate evidence.
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Make it stick
Which explanation best fits this lesson?
If you needed the solution, close it and solve the problem again from a blank page. A correct answer is stronger when you can explain the reason for each step.